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The cause of the crash varies on person, based on what research they have made leading them to believe something else, mostly varying from Chippendale’s report which blamed the pilot, to Mahon’s report which blamed Air New Zealand. Like any crash, there are a variety of causes that caused the accident, however if one of these ceased to exist, the accident could have been prevented.
White out:
The aircraft was flying 450 meters above sea level in whiteout atmospheric conditions, where the ice and clouds blend into one, making it almost impossible to distinguish between land and air. The Cock pit voice recorders of the pilots minutes before impact indicate whiteout conditions, as the pilots, along with Peter Mulgrew, are in a state of confusion as to their location, as it was impossible to tell from their point of view. When the pilot’s thought they were flying through McMurdo Sound with Mt Erebus to their left and Ross Island on their right, however were highly disorientated as Mt Erebus was straight in front of them, and they were making a b-line into the side of the mountain. Because it was impossible to view, they relied solely on the navigation system of the aircraft, which unknown to them, was set to the wrong coordinates.
43.27- Mulgrew: “There you go, there is some land ahead”
45:36- Mulgrew: “Taylor on the right now”
46:39- Brooks: “Where’s Erebus in relation to us at the moment?”
Maloney or Mulgrew: “Left, about 4 or 5 miles, about 11’oclock.”
Mulgrew: Yes, no, no, I really don’t know”
47:02- Mulgrew: “That’s the edge.”
48.10- Ross Island there. Erebus should be here
Gordon Vette did extensive research which he presented to the commission on the white out theory and concluded that it was one of the major contributing factors into the crash. Air New Zealand dismissed Captain Gordon Vette's claims into the phenomenon, because the pilots were inexperienced in flying in the Antarctic and they believed the pilots should have flew above the altitude if they thought they were in danger, or were confused about their surroundings. Air New Zealand showed no sympathy towards the pilot's, with whom they placed the blame on. This was obvious when they did not take any responsibility for the crash, even though they were clearly in the wrong, especially for the change in flight plans with out informing the crew, which they heavily relied on when they turned to the navigation when they experienced "the white out phenomenon" which is only experienced in the Antarctic.
White out:
The aircraft was flying 450 meters above sea level in whiteout atmospheric conditions, where the ice and clouds blend into one, making it almost impossible to distinguish between land and air. The Cock pit voice recorders of the pilots minutes before impact indicate whiteout conditions, as the pilots, along with Peter Mulgrew, are in a state of confusion as to their location, as it was impossible to tell from their point of view. When the pilot’s thought they were flying through McMurdo Sound with Mt Erebus to their left and Ross Island on their right, however were highly disorientated as Mt Erebus was straight in front of them, and they were making a b-line into the side of the mountain. Because it was impossible to view, they relied solely on the navigation system of the aircraft, which unknown to them, was set to the wrong coordinates.
43.27- Mulgrew: “There you go, there is some land ahead”
45:36- Mulgrew: “Taylor on the right now”
46:39- Brooks: “Where’s Erebus in relation to us at the moment?”
Maloney or Mulgrew: “Left, about 4 or 5 miles, about 11’oclock.”
Mulgrew: Yes, no, no, I really don’t know”
47:02- Mulgrew: “That’s the edge.”
48.10- Ross Island there. Erebus should be here
Gordon Vette did extensive research which he presented to the commission on the white out theory and concluded that it was one of the major contributing factors into the crash. Air New Zealand dismissed Captain Gordon Vette's claims into the phenomenon, because the pilots were inexperienced in flying in the Antarctic and they believed the pilots should have flew above the altitude if they thought they were in danger, or were confused about their surroundings. Air New Zealand showed no sympathy towards the pilot's, with whom they placed the blame on. This was obvious when they did not take any responsibility for the crash, even though they were clearly in the wrong, especially for the change in flight plans with out informing the crew, which they heavily relied on when they turned to the navigation when they experienced "the white out phenomenon" which is only experienced in the Antarctic.
![Picture](/uploads/5/1/1/6/51164569/1490352.jpg?305)
Descent below 6000
Typically in the flights to the Antarctic, pilots descended below 1000 meters to give their passengers a better experience with exceptional views, and so it was uncommon when the pilots on flight 901 requested to McMurdo centre to fly below 1000 meters. Permission was granted to the pilots to descend below 3050 meters and proceed “visually”, and not long after, continued to drop to 610 meters, at which point he locked in the navigational system. Assuming they were flying over flat ground along the McMurdo Sound, they were heavily relying on the navigation system, which unknown to them, had been set to the wrong coordinates and was flying across Lewis Sound and on route to collide with the 3794 meter Mt Erebus, which happened 4 minutes after the descent.
The decision to fly at this altitude was heavily criticised as Air New Zealand stated that in the guidelines they were not allowed to descend below 6000 meters, and if they had not, then the aircraft would have safely passed over the top of the 3050-meter high mountain. However because the pilots didn’t know about the change to the flight plan, they had no way of knowing where the plane was headed and its path, and if either of these problems were not present, the crash would have been avoided.
Typically in the flights to the Antarctic, pilots descended below 1000 meters to give their passengers a better experience with exceptional views, and so it was uncommon when the pilots on flight 901 requested to McMurdo centre to fly below 1000 meters. Permission was granted to the pilots to descend below 3050 meters and proceed “visually”, and not long after, continued to drop to 610 meters, at which point he locked in the navigational system. Assuming they were flying over flat ground along the McMurdo Sound, they were heavily relying on the navigation system, which unknown to them, had been set to the wrong coordinates and was flying across Lewis Sound and on route to collide with the 3794 meter Mt Erebus, which happened 4 minutes after the descent.
The decision to fly at this altitude was heavily criticised as Air New Zealand stated that in the guidelines they were not allowed to descend below 6000 meters, and if they had not, then the aircraft would have safely passed over the top of the 3050-meter high mountain. However because the pilots didn’t know about the change to the flight plan, they had no way of knowing where the plane was headed and its path, and if either of these problems were not present, the crash would have been avoided.
![Picture](/uploads/5/1/1/6/51164569/892558.jpg?1430721022)
Changes to the navigation system
Fourteen months prior to the accident, there was an error in the flight plan, and the night before the accident an Air New Zealand official slightly changed the coordinates, however due to the error in the flight plan months earlier this resulted in being a 27 mile difference in where the plane was meant to go, and where it ended it up being. The pilots on the flight had prepared for a flight plan that was given to them 2 weeks prior, but were not informed about the change in flight plan so assumed that the plane would fly down McMurdo sound. When the pilots descended to 610 meters, the pilots switched to the navigation system, which took them on a path that coincided with Mt Erebus. This however caused a lot of controversy as Air New Zealand’s defence was that if the pilots had not dropped to this level, the route that was programmed into the navigation would not have been troublesome as the plane would have flown over Mt Erebus, and that the pilots should have double checked the flight coordinates before the flight occurred, however this was excused when Air New Zealand made their public apology.
Fourteen months prior to the accident, there was an error in the flight plan, and the night before the accident an Air New Zealand official slightly changed the coordinates, however due to the error in the flight plan months earlier this resulted in being a 27 mile difference in where the plane was meant to go, and where it ended it up being. The pilots on the flight had prepared for a flight plan that was given to them 2 weeks prior, but were not informed about the change in flight plan so assumed that the plane would fly down McMurdo sound. When the pilots descended to 610 meters, the pilots switched to the navigation system, which took them on a path that coincided with Mt Erebus. This however caused a lot of controversy as Air New Zealand’s defence was that if the pilots had not dropped to this level, the route that was programmed into the navigation would not have been troublesome as the plane would have flown over Mt Erebus, and that the pilots should have double checked the flight coordinates before the flight occurred, however this was excused when Air New Zealand made their public apology.